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REVISED ARTICLE 9: A PRIMER FOR THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER
David Frisch*
I. INTRODUCTION
These are exciting times for commercial lawyers. Over the past
fifteen years, the sponsoring organizations of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC or the Code), the American Law Institute
(ALI) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL), have been hard at work to keep the UCC
responsive to contemporary needs. Aside from periodic adjust-
ments to existing UCC articles that reflect societal changes,' two
new articles have been added to cover commercial activity previ-
ously governed by the common law of contract.' In 1998, the ALI
and NCCUSL gave their approval to the final text of the newest
version of Article 9 (Revised Article 9) after eight years of study,
drafting, and the inevitable wrangling between consumer and
creditor representatives.' Aside from a few conforming amend-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.S., 1971, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., 1975, University of Miami School of Law, cum laude; L.L.M., 1980,
Yale Law School.
1. Within the past twelve years, the ALI and NCCUSL have revised Articles 3 (Ne-
gotiable Instruments) (1990), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) (1990), 5 (Letters of
Credit) (1995), 6 (Bulk Sales) (1989), 8 (Investment Securities) (1994), and 9 (Secured
Transactions) (1998). The ALI considered and approved the final draft of a revised Article
1 (General Provisions) at its May 2001 meeting, The American Law Institute, Actions
Taken on 2001 Annual Meeting Drafts, at http://www.ali.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2001),
and NCCUSL did the same at its August meeting, Uniform Law Commissioners: The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revision of Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Article 1--General Provisions, at http://vww.nccusl.org/nccusl (last visited
Oct. 6, 2001). Drafting committees are currently revising Article 2 (Sales), 2A (Leases), 3,
4, 4A (Funds Transfers), and 7 (Documents of Title).
2. See U.C.C. art. 2A (Leases) (1998); U.C.C. art. 4A (Funds Transfers) (1998).
3. The project began in 1990 when the ALI and NCCUSL appointed a committee to
study Article 9 and recommend needed changes. The committee issued its final report in
1992. See REP. OFTHE ART. 9 STUDY COIM. OFTHE PERM. ED. BD. FORTHE U.C.C. (Dec. 1,
1992) [hereinafter ARTICLE 9 REPORT]. From the inception of the drafting process in 1993,
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ments occasioned by changes in other articles, this is the first
time that Article 9 had been revised since 1972.4
Much to its credit, the Virginia General Assembly took a giant
step in the direction of sensible law reform when it enacted the
new (and improved) Article 9 during its 2000 legislative session.5
The statute took effect in Virginia on July 1, 2001.'
Why the need for Revised Article 9? In 1992, the following an-
swer was given by the Article 9 study committee:
During the two decades since [Article 9 was last revised], the secured
credit markets have seen continued growth and unprecedented inno-
vation. In addition, many hundreds of judicial decisions applying Ar-
ticle 9 have been reported and a large volume of commentary on Ar-
ticle 9, both scholarly and practice-oriented, has emerged. Moreover,
the enactment by Congress of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978...
has had a profound effect on secured transactions. These develop-
ments have led to a strong consensus ... that although Article 9 is
fundamentally sound, serious consideration should be given to the
revision of some of the Article's provisions.
7
When the study committee prepared its report nearly a decade
ago, it was impossible to foresee the extent to which the existing
law would be rewritten.8 As it turned out, the drafting committee
consumer advocates and consumer credit representatives were at loggerheads. The com-
promise reached was that Revised Article 9 would leave untouched the old law for con-
sumer transactions, except for some very minor changes. Thus, both sides grudgingly
agreed not to oppose the statute in the state legislatures.
4. This article cites to sections in "former" Article 9 as VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-xmx
(Repl. Vol. 1991) or VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-xxx (Cum. Supp. 2000), and to provisions in
"new" or "revised" Article 9 as VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-xxx (Repl. Vol. 2001).
5. Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch. 1007, 2000 Va. Acts 1204 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.9A-101 to -709 (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-701 (Repl. Vol. 2001). U.C.C. § 9-701 (1999) provides for an
initial effective date of July 1, 2001. It was the drafters' hope that on this date Revised Ar-
ticle 9 would become effective nationwide, thereby eliminating many of the problems that
would otherwise arise during the transition period. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-701 cmt.
(Repl. Vol. 2001) ("If former Article 9 is in effect in some jurisdictions, and this article is in
effect in others, horrendous complications may arise."). That hope was realized. As of July
1, 2001, Revised Article 9 went into effect in all fifty states and the District of Columbia
except for Connecticut, where it will go into effect October 1, 2001, and Alabama, Florida,
and Mississippi, where it will go into effect January 1, 2002. See Uniform Law Commis-
sioners: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Legislative
Status and Information on Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl (last visited Oct.
18, 2001).
7. ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
8. Ironically, even the study committee saw no need for a substantial overhaul of Ar-
ticle 9. See id. ("[T]here seems to be little support or need for fundamental changes to the
ARTICLE 9
was not content merely cleaning up the relatively few problematic
sections of the previous version of Article 9 (Old Article 9) and
giving statutory recognition to technological developments. In-
stead, it succeeded in producing a statute that dwarfs its former
self in both complexity and difficulty. Although Revised Article 9
covers much of the same territory as Old Article 9 and does not
abandon the existing legal framework, the changes it has brought
are far-reaching. Old Article 9 has been reorganized, new sections
have been added, related sections in other parts of the Code have
been rewritten, and numerous substantive changes have been
made. Those acquainted with Old Article 9 will, in many in-
stances, find themselves in an unfamiliar environment.
The primary purpose of this article is to assist the general
practitioner in adjusting to the new world of secured transactions
by summarizing many of the key differences between Old Article
9 and Revised Article 9 as contained in the Virginia Code. In this
vein, no attempt will be made to discuss the many nuances of the
statute or how it will impact highly specialized practice areas,
such as agricultural finance, oil, gas and mineral financing, secu-
rity interests in letters of credit, and the arcane world of securiti-
zation. This article assumes, however, that the reader has some
familiarity with the basic structure, concepts, and terminology of
Old Article 9. The uninitiated will have to look elsewhere for the
statutory basics.
Part I discusses the expanded scope of Revised Article 9 and its
effect on revised Virginia Code section 8.9A. Parts II and III de-
tail the important changes concerning attachment and perfection
of security interests. Part IV analyzes the effect of the revisions
upon common priority disputes. Part V provides an overview of
the new provisions that govern default and enforcement of secu-
rity interests. Finally, Part VI explains the basic transition rules
that will guide the changeover from prior law to the new statute.
II. THE EXPANDED SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9
Revised Article 9 will apply to many transactions that were
formerly outside the scope of the old statute.9 The expanded cov-
scope and structure of Article 9.").
9. Conceptually, the basic scope of Old Article 9 remains unchanged. It will continue
2o001]
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erage has been achieved by a combination of drafting strategies.
One strategy was to narrow considerably the long list of excluded
transactions contained in Old Article 9, codified at Virginia Code
section 8.9-104.o Another strategy was to expressly add transac-
tions that were previously governed by other statutory provi-
sions." A third strategy was a bit more subtle; the drafting com-
mittee was able to extend the tentacles of Article 9 by tinkering
with some of its defined terms. 2 The following is an overview of
the major areas affected by the revision.
A. Deposit Accounts
Old Article 9 excluded security interests in various forms of de-
posit accounts, except insofar as they constituted proceeds of
other collateral. 3 This meant that the scope, attachment, perfec-
tion, priority, and enforcement of consensual liens on this ubiqui-
tous form of property were left to the vagaries of the common law.
Official Comment 7 in the old Virginia Code section 8.9-104 ex-
plained the exclusion by stating: "Such transactions are often
quite special, do not fit easily under a general commercial statute
and are adequately covered by existing law."14 But commentators
have always believed otherwise, and for years they have argued
that deposit accounts-as original collateral-should be within
the ambit of Article 9.15
to apply to those consensual interests in personal property and fixtures that are created
for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation. Compare VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.9A-109(a)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.9-102(1)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
10. Id. § 8.9-104 (Cum. Supp. 2000). Old Article 9, as codified in Virginia, excluded
twelve transactions from the coverage of Article 9. Id. Many of these exclusions were justi-
fied on the ground that the transactions described were outside the mainstream of com-
mercial lending. See id. cmts. 3, 6, 8 (Repl. Vol. 1991). The new list of exclusions in revised
Virginia Code section 8.9A-109 reflects how much the lending business has changed since
the Code was first drafted. See id. § 8.9A-109 (Repl. Vol. 2001); see also infra notes 13-19
and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 28-33, 40-45, and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-104() (Cum. Supp. 2000) (excluding a non-proceeds in-
terest in a "deposit account"); id. § 8.9-105(e) (Cum. Supp. 2000) (defining "deposit ac-
count"); id. § 8.9-306(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000) (including deposit accounts within the defini-
tion of "cash proceeds"). California, Hawaii, and Louisiana enacted non-uniform
amendments to Article 9 to permit security interests in deposit accounts. See Hawkland
U.C.C. Series Local Code Variations, Art. 9-Part 1, at 11-17 (2001).
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-104 cmt. 7 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
15. See, e.g., Luize E. Zubrow, Integration of Deposit Account Financing into Article 9
ARTICLE 9
Notwithstanding the support of academics and the eventual
recommendation of the Article 9 study committee to include de-
posit accounts in any revision of the statute, 6 not everyone on the
drafting committee was initially persuaded that the long-time
rule of exclusion should be changed. 7 Eventually, however, the
supporters of the inclusion of deposit accounts within the scope of
Article 9 won out, and the new form of collateral makes its debut
under Revised Article 9 with one exception:' 8 the drafting com-
mittee accepted the arguments of consumer advocates and ex-
cluded security interests in deposit accounts as part of consumer
transactions.' 9
B. Commercial Tort Claims
No longer are all tort claims excluded from the scope of Article
9.20 In fact, the 2000 statutory revision applies to one particular
brand of tort claim-the "commercial tort."2' To qualify as a
"commercial tort claim,"22 the claimant must be an organization
or, if an individual, the claim must be business-related and not
involve personal injury.23 However, this new form of collateral is
subject to several special rules designed to make sure that the
debtor does not inadvertently encumber a claim. First, a security
interest will only arise if the particular claim is specifically de-
scribed in the security agreement.24 Thus, a generic description
of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 MINN. L. REV. 899
(1984).
16. See ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 3, at 68-71.
17. Id.
18. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-109(a), (d)(13) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
19. See id. § 8.9A-109(d)(13) (Repl. Vol. 2001). "Consumer transaction," in turn, is de-
fined as "a transaction in which (i) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes, (ii) a security interest secures the obligation, and (iii)
the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."
Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(26) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Presumably a lender may still acquire a lien on the
deposit account under non-Code law. See id. § 8.9A-102 cmt. 16 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
20. Compare id. § 8.9-104(k) (Cum. Supp. 2000), with id. § 8.9A-109(d)(12) (Repl. Vol.
2001).
2L See id. § 8.9A-109(d)(12) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
22. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(13) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
23. Id.
24. See id. § 8.9A-108(e) (Repl. Vol. 2001). This does not mean that the description
must indicate the amount of the claim, its underlying theory, or the identity of the tortfea-
sor(s). A sufficient description, for example, would be "all tort claims arising out of the ex-
plosion of debtors factory." Id. § 8.9A-108 cmt. 5 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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by type alone (for example, "tort claims") will not be sufficient.25
Second, the lender can only take an effective interest in existing
tort claims, rather than those that are after-acquired.26 If the
debtor acquires a tort claim after executing the security agree-
ment, no security interest will arise in the absence of a new
agreement.27
C. Agricultural Liens
An "agricultural lien" is a nonpossessory statutory lien that
may arise in favor of those persons providing goods, services, or
land to farmers.2" These liens typically occupy a rather obscure
niche in the remedial structure of each state, with little uniform-
ity among states on such basic matters as perfection, priority, and
enforcement. Revised Article 9 seeks to add clarity to this mud-
dled picture by partially incorporating those statutory liens on
farm products that fall within the new definition of "agricultural
lien."29 Because the lien retains its character as a statutory lien, a
security agreement is unnecessary. ° The lienor, however, is re-
quired to perfect its interest by filing a financing statement in the
Article 9 filing office,3 and must look to the provisions of Revised
Article 9 to determine the priority of the lien vis-A-vis various
competing third-party claimants.32 Similarly, the enforcement
provisions of Part 6 of Revised Article 9 are generally applicable
to agricultural liens.33
D. Health-Care-Insurance Receivables
The provisions of Revised Article 9 dealing with security inter-
ests in rights under life insurance and other policies continue the
25. Id. § 8.9A-108(e) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
26. See id. § 8.9A-204(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
27. See id. § 8.9A-204 cmt. 4 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
28. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
29. See id. § 8.9A-109(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
30. Although agricultural liens are not captured by the definition of "security inter-
est," see id. § 8.1-201(37) (Repl. Vol. 2001), the lienor is a "secured party." See id. § 8.9A-
102(a)(72) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
31. See id. §§ 8.9A-308(b), -310(a), -501(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
32. See id. § 8.9A-317 & cmt. 7 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
33. See id. § 8.9A-601(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
rules of the former statute with one significant difference. 4 By
including health-care-insurance receivables fully within its scope,
the revision confronts the challenge of bringing some uniformity
and consistency to the financing of the health-care industry.35 A
"health-care-insurance receivable" is defined as "an interest in or
claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a
monetary obligation for health-care goods or services provided."36
It should also be noted that the expanded definition of "account"
in Virginia Code section 8.9A-102(a)(2) includes health-care-
insurance receivables.37 What difference does it make that a
health-care-insurance receivable is an account? Article 9 has al-
ways applied to both security interests in and sales of accounts.3"
Thus, the provisions on priority and perfection are applicable to
the outright sale of health-care insurance receivables. However, if
the receivable is transferred to the doctor, hospital, or other
health-care provider, it is automatically perfected upon attach-
ment. 9
E. Consignments
In modern distribution systems, an owner will sometimes de-
liver goods to a consignee for the purpose of selling those goods to
third parties. Under Old Article 9, the rights of a true consignor
did not qualify as a security interest. ° Notwithstanding the fact
that the consignor was the actual "owner" of the goods while they
remained in possession of the consignee, the consignor was often
well-advised to behave as if his interest was no more than a secu-
rity interest. The statutory impetus for this seemingly inconsis-
tent behavior was old Virginia Code section 8.2-326, which subor-
dinated the consignor's interest to the claims of the consignee's
creditors unless (1) the consignor could prove that the consignee
34. See id. § 8.9-104(g) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
35. See id. § 8.9A-109(d)(8) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
36. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(46) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
37. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(2)(viii) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
38. See id. § 8.9A-109(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9-102(1)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
39. See id. § 8.9A-309(5) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
40. See id. § 8.1-201(37) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000). This discussion of con-
signments assumes that the transaction is not in substance a traditional secured transac-
tion. A so-called "false consignment" that secures an obligation has been and will be
treated, for all purposes, as an ordinary secured transaction. See id.; id. § 8.9A-102(a)(2)
(Repl. Vol. 2001).
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was "generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged
in selling the goods of others;" (2) the consignor complied with a
relevant sign law showing its interest; or (3) the consignor filed a
financing statement under Article 9.41 Because only a handful of
states had sign laws, and since no consignor would eagerly relish
the prospect of litigating what others knew or did not know about
the consignee's business, the only safe course for the consignor
was to act as if he were a secured party and file under Article 9.4"
In response to the inadequacies of old Virginia Code section
8.2-326, the drafters decided to give most true consignments their
rightful place directly within the scope of Article 9.43 As a result,
under revised section 8.9A-317, all consignors who are not explic-
itly excluded by the definition in revised Virginia Code section
8.9A-102(a)(20) hold security interests that, if left unperfected,
will be subordinate to lien creditors and others.' Although
treated as a secured party for purposes of perfection and priority,
41. See id. § 8.2-326(3) (Cum. Supp. 2000). Subordination would only occur in those
cases where the consignee did business under a different name than the consignor. See id.
42. Moreover, old Virginia Code section 8.9-114 subordinated the consignor's interest
to the interest of a secured party with a prior security interest in the consignee's inventory
unless the consignor jumped through the hoops of old Virginia section 8.9-312(3). See id. §
8.9-312(3) (Cum. Supp. 2000); id. § 8.9-114 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
43. See id. § 8.1-201(37) (Repl. Vol. 2001). The term "consignment" is defined as fol-
lows:
.[C]onsignment" means a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a per-
son delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:
(A) the merchant:
(i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the name
of the person making delivery;
(ii) is not an auctioneer; and
(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially
engaged in selling the goods of others;
(B) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods is
$1,000 or more at the time of delivery;
(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery; and
(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an
obligation.
Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(20) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
44. See id. § 8.9A-317 (Repl. Vol. 2001). Because subsection (3) has been dropped from
section 2-326, the respective interests of the consignor and the consignees' creditors in
consigned goods that fall through the cracks of revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-
102(a)(20) will be governed by the common law of the particular states. Compare id. § 8.2-
326 (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.2-326 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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the true consignor, however, is not subject to Part 6 of Revised
Article 9 on foreclosure.45
F. Sales of Rights to Payment
Although Old Article 9 applied to the sale of rights to payment
arising from goods or services transactions (accounts), it left the
sale of rights to payment arising from other transactions (general
intangibles) to non-Code law.46 In order to accommodate the grow-
ing number and the economic importance of securitization trans-
actions, the reach of Revised Article 9 has been expanded consid-
erably to pull in a much broader spectrum of sales of
receivables.'
The drafting committee accomplished this result by making es-
sentially three changes to the statute. First, the definition of "ac-
count" was rewritten to include payment obligations arising out
of the sale, lease, or license of all kinds of tangible and intangible
property, including credit card receivables and lottery winnings.48
Thus, for example, the sale of rights to payment arising from the
disposition of intellectual property is now covered by Revised Ar-
ticle 9.49
The second change wrought by the drafters of Revised Article 9
was the creation of a new subset of general intangibles called
"payment intangibles," whose sale was then brought within the
scope of the statute." A payment intangible is defined as "a gen-
eral intangible under which the account debtor's principal obliga-
tion is a monetary obligation."51 Accordingly, the sale of loans is
now clearly within the statute, but it may be less obvious which
other transactions are covered. The resulting challenge for practi-
45. See id. § 8.9A-109 cmt. 6 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
46. Compare id. § 8.9-102(1)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1991), with id. § 8.9-104 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
Old Article 9 also applied to the sale of chattel paper. See id. § 8.9-102(1)(b) (Repl. Vol.
1991). Revised Article 9 continues this rule. See id. § 8.9A-109(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
47. Id. § 8.9A-109(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Revised Article 9 specifically excludes from its
scope the sale of payment obligations that are clearly outside the mainstream of commer-
cial financing transactions. See id. § 8.9A-109(d)(4)-(7) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
48. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
49. See id. § 8.9A-102 cmt. 5a (Repl. Vol. 2001).
50. See id. § 8.9A-109(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
51. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(61) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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tioners will be to determine whether a monetary obligation is
"principal" or ancillary.
Finally, the drafters extended the scope of Revised Article 9 to
include the sale of promissory notes.52 Because the new definition
of "promissory note" expressly excludes an "order to pay,"53 Re-
vised Article 9 still does not address the sale of checks and other
drafts.
III. ATTACHMENT OF THE SECURITY INTEREST
Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-203 is modeled on and
largely continues the substance of old Virginia Code section 8.9-
203, which governs the attachment of the security interest.54
However, the revised version of this provision is updated to ac-
count for electronic commerce.5 Instead of signing the security
agreement, it must now be authenticated by the debtor.56 Thus,
digital signatures and electronic security agreements are now
sufficient.57
Revised Article 9 section 8.9A-108(b) provides guidance as to
when a description of collateral in the security agreement satis-
fies the general rule that it must "reasonably identif[y] what is
described."58 Subsection (b)(3) expressly validates generic descrip-
tions by category59 and by the type of collateral defined in the
Code.6" Presumably, this means that descriptions such as "inven-
52. See id. § 8.9A-109(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
53. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(65) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
54. Compare id. § 8.9A-203 (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.9-203 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
55. See id. § 8.9A-203(b)(3)(D) (Repi. Vol. 2001).
56. See id. § 8.9A-203(b)(3)(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). In addition to a traditional signature,
authenticate means "to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly proc-
ess a record in whole or in part, with the present intent of the authenticating person to
identify the person and adopt or accept a record." Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(7)(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
"Record," in turn, means "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." Id. § 8.9A-
102(a)(69) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
57. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-203 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
58. See id. § 8.9A-108(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
59. Id. § 8.9A-108(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
60. Id. § 8.9A-108(b)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Under revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-
108(e), description by type is an insufficient description of commercial tort claims and, in
consumer transactions, consumer goods, security entitlements, securities accounts, or com-
modity accounts. Id. § 8.9A-108(e) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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tory" or "equipment" are now clearly sufficient. Although generic
descriptions were approved by the drafting committee, the use of
"supergeneric" descriptions in the security agreement was not.6'
Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-108(c) provides that a descrip-
tion of the collateral as "all the debtor's assets" or "all the debtor's
personal property" does not reasonably identify the collateral.62
The provisions of Revised Article 9 governing security interests
in proceeds of collateral generally track their analogues in Old
Article 9,63 although there is a new expanded definition of "pro-
ceeds" worth noting. Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-
102(a)(64) now defines "proceeds" to include distributions on ac-
count of collateral.' Also, whatever is acquired upon the lease or
license of collateral is proceeds.65
Another matter that is clarified under Revised Article 9 is that
a security interest in a "[s]upporting obligation,"66 such as a let-
ter-of-credit right or a guaranty, automatically follows from a se-
curity interest in the underlying supported collateral.67
IV. PERFECTION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST
Among the most important changes in the Article 9 revision
are those that pertain to the perfection of security interests. A se-
curity interest is usually perfected when it has attached and all
the applicable requirements for perfection have been satisfied."
In a few circumstances, however, the security interest is auto-
matically perfected the moment it attaches. 69 The availability of
61. See id. § 8.9A-108 cmt. 2 (Repl. Vol. 2001). On the other hand, revised Virginia
Code section 8.9A-504(2) approves a description in the financing statement if it "covers all
assets or all personal property." Id. § 8.9A-504(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
62. Id. § 8.9A-108(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
63. Compare id. § 8.9A-203(f) (Repl. Vol. 2001), and id. § 8.9A-315(a)(2) (Repl. Vol.
2001), with id. § 8.9-203(3) (Cum. Supp. 2000), and id. § 8.9-306(2) (Cure. Supp. 2000).
64. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(64)(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
65. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(64)(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Arguably, these proceeds were also
proceeds under Old Article 9, but now the matter is settled. See id. § 8.9A-102 cmt. 13
(Repl. Vol. 2001).
66. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(77) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
67. See id. § 8.9A-203(f) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
68. See id. § 8.9A-308(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001). In Virginia, the requirements for perfection
are located in revised Virginia Code sections 8.9A-310 through 8.9A-316. See id.; id. §§
8.9A-310 to -317 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
69. See id. H8 8.9A-308(d), -309 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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any given method of perfection depends upon the particular type
of collateral and, sometimes, upon the nature of the transaction. °
A. Automatic Perfection
Revised Article 9 adds three significant new kinds of security
interests to the list of those that are perfected when they attach-
payment intangibles, promissory notes, and supporting obliga-
tions-all of which were the result of statutory changes made
elsewhere.7' As you may recall, Revised Article 9 applies to cer-
tain transactions in rights to payment that do not secure pay-
ment or performance of an obligation.72 The drafters feared, how-
ever, that applying the perfection provisions of Revised Article 9
to the sale of general intangibles and promissory notes would un-
duly interfere with the well-functioning loan participation market
that has, until now, prospered without the requirement of public
notice.73 Yet, at the same time, no one doubted that buyers of
these forms of receivables would benefit greatly from the applica-
tion of Article 9's priority rules, especially in the seller's bank-
ruptcy proceeding.74
The drafting committee solved this dilemma of exclusion or in-
clusion by providing that sales of payment intangibles and prom-
issory notes are perfected automatically upon attachment.75 How-
ever, at least one problem remains. Because the automatic
perfection rule is limited to true sales, an additional step must
still be taken to perfect an interest in a payment intangible or
promissory note that secures an obligation.76 In borderline cases,
the secured party/buyer would be wise to take that step.
The third new automatic perfection rule is located in revised
Virginia Code section 8.9A-308(d).77 If the security interest in col-
70. See id. § 8.9A-308 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
71. Compare id. § 8.9A-309(Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.9-302 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
72. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
73. See Steven L. Schwartz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 955 (1999).
74. Id. at 956.
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-309(3), -309(4) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
76. See id.; id. § 8.9A-310(a), (b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
77. See id. § 8.9A-308(d) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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lateral is perfected, the security interest in the supporting obliga-
tion is also perfected. 8
B. Perfection by Possession
Revised Article 9 deals with a method of perfection that gener-
ated much controversy under the former version of the statute-
perfection by possession-where the collateral is held by a third
party who has not issued a negotiable document of title covering
the goods. 9 Under old Virginia Code section 8.9-305, the security
interest became perfected the moment the third party received
notice of the interest, regardless of whether he acknowledged the
notice or agreed to act as the secured party's bailee.80 Old Article
9 never clarified what the involuntary bailee's responsibilities
were in this situation.
Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-308 does much to clean up
this area. Now, perfection requires that the bailee acknowledge in
an authenticated record that it is holding the collateral for the se-
cured party's benefit.8 ' However, the bailee cannot be made to do
so; the text explicitly rejects the notion that bailee status can be
involuntary. 2 Moreover, even if the bailee does acknowledge that
it holds for the secured party, its responsibilities as bailee will
depend on the agreement between the parties. 3 Thus, no aspect
of the relationship between the secured party and the bailee can
be involuntary.
Beyond this, the statute was revised to reject the holding in At-
lantic Computer" that acknowledgment by a lessee who leases
collateral from the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business is sufficient to perfect the security interest.85 Such a per-
78. See id.; see also § 8.9A-308(e) (Repl. Vol. 2001) ("Perfection of a security interest in
a right to payment or performance also perfects a security interest in a security interest,
mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.").
79. See id. § 8.9A-312(f) & cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
80. See, e.g., In re Atlantic Computer Sys., Inc., 135 B.R. 463, 470 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992).
81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-313(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
82. See id. § 8.9A-313(f) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
83. See id. § 8.9A-313(g)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
84. Atlantic Computer, 135 B.R. at 470.
85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-313(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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son is believed to be too closely connected to the debtor to provide
adequate public notice of the security interest. 6
C. Perfection by Control
When Article 8 was revised in 1994, several amendments were
made to Article 9. Those amendments resulted in the addition of
Virginia Code section 8.9-115.7 The upshot of these amendments
was that "control" became the preferred method of perfecting a
security interest in investment property (stocks, bonds, mutual
fund, and the like).8" Control in this context meant putting one-
self in the position to have the securities sold without further ac-
tion by the debtor.89 This is essentially the approach taken by Re-
vised Article 9.9o
Control is now the exclusive method for perfecting a security
interest in a deposit account.91 There are three ways to achieve
control over a deposit account, depending upon the relationship
between the bank and the secured party. Initially, if the secured
party happens to be the bank with which the account is main-
tained, then the security agreement alone is sufficient to give the
bank control.92 Hence, a word of warning: "[All actual and poten-
tial creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank
with which the debtor's account is maintained may assert a claim
against the deposit account."
9 3
Less significant are the control provisions for non-bank secured
parties.94 Here a non-bank secured party gains control if it be-
86. See id. § 8.9A-313 cmt. 4 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
87. Id. § 8.9-115 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
88. With the introduction of control as a method of perfection came the basic priority
rule that a secured party who obtains control has priority over other claimants who do not
obtain control. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-115 (Cum. Supp. 2000). So even though a security
interest in investment property could be perfected by filing, see id. § 8.9A-115(e) (Rep.
Vol. 2001), it would be best to take control. Moreover, with control, one need not have a
written security agreement. See id. § 8.9-203(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
89. See id. § 8.8A-106 cmt. 1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
90. See id. §§ 8.9A-106, -314 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
91. See id. §§ 8.9A-312(b)(1), -314(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Revised Article 9 also provides
for perfection by control if the collateral is letter-of-credit rights, see id. § 8.9A-314(a)
(Repl. Vol. 2001), or electronic chattel paper. See id.
92. See id. § 8.9A-104(a)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
93. Id. § 8.9A-104 cmt. 3 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
94. See id. §§ 8.9A-105 to -107 (Rep. Vol. 2001). Control by non-bank secured parties
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comes the depository bank's customer with respect to the de-
posit,95 or if the depository bank agrees that it will obey disposi-
tion orders from the secured party without first obtaining the as-
sent of the debtor.96 The first method is straightforward; if the
account is transferred to the name of the secured party, then it
will have control." The second method envisions an authenti-
cated agreement among the debtor, the depository bank, and the
secured party.9" The debtor need not give up his right to direct
disposition of the funds in the account; as long as the secured
party is able to do so, the secured party will have control.99
D. Perfection by Filing
The provisions of Revised Article 9 that govern the filing of fi-
nancing statements present a host of substantive changes that
deserve mention. In addition to expanding the categories of col-
lateral that can be perfected by filing to include instruments and
investment property,' Part 5 of Revised Article 9 goes a long
way toward making the filing system more reliable and efficient.
The major changes are discussed below.
1. Filing Location
There are some kinds of collateral (e.g., ordinary goods) that
have a relatively fixed identifiable physical presence, and there
are some kinds of collateral (e.g., accounts) that do not. This sim-
ple observation seems to have influenced the drafters of Old Arti-
cle 9 in their selection of choice-of-law rules. For ordinary goods,
will be less significant than control by the depository bank for two reasons. First, the secu-
rity interest will have less value to non-bank secured parties because the depository
bank's security interest-if it exists-will always have priority. See infra notes 142-46 and
accompanying text. Second, control by the non-bank secured party may not be possible or
practical.
95. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-104(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
96. See id. § 8.9A-104(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
97. See id. § 8.9A-104(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.4-104(5) (Repl. Vol. 2001) (defin-
ing "customer"). It is unclear whether the debtor can continue to have the right to draw on
the account as joint owner. Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-104(b) suggests that she
can. See id. § 8.9A-104(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
98. See id. § 8.9A-104(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
99. See id.
100. See id. § 8.9A-310(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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the drafters required that the secured party perfect its interest by
filing the financing statement under the laws of the jurisdiction of
the collateral's location.' °' However, if the collateral was of the
latter kind, the filing was governed by the laws of the jurisdiction
where the debtor was located.0 2
Revised Article 9 recognizes that a bifurcated filing system can
be unnecessarily messy and complex. Under the new rules, all fi-
nancing statements are filed in the jurisdiction of the debtor's lo-
cation.0 3 But in order to determine where the debtor is located,
one must consider revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-307. If the
debtor is incorporated or otherwise organized as a registered or-
ganization, its location is the state in which it is registered.0 4 If
the debtor is an unregistered entity, it is located in the state in
which it maintains its chief executive office.0 5 The location of an
individual is his or her principal residence.0 6
Once the secured party determines the proper state in which to
file, there is still the question of where in the state to file. Old Ar-
ticle 9 provided states with three alternative provisions from
which to choose.0 7 Each provision combined both central and lo-
cal filing requirements, and one alternative required a dual filing
in some cases.' Revised Article 9 generally requires a single cen-
tral filing.0 9 Local filings in the real estate office are required
only for as-extracted collateral, timber to be cut, or fixture fil-
ings. 110
2. Contents of the Financing Statement
Revised Article 9, like Old Article 9, provides that the financing
statement must give the name of the debtor."' Because financing
101. See id. § 8.9-103(1)(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
102. See id. § 8.9-103(3)(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
103. See id. § 8.9A-301 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
104. See id. § 8.9A-307(e) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
105. See id. § 8.9A-307(b)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
106. See id. § 8.9A-307(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
107. See id. § 8.9A-501 cmt. 2 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
108. See id. Prior to the most recent revisions, Virginia had adopted the dual filing al-
ternative. See id. § 8.9-401(1) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
109. See id. § 8.9A-501 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
110. See id.
111. Compare id. § 8.9A-502(a)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.9-402(1) (Gum. Supp.
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statements are indexed under the debtor's name, using the cor-
rect name is the key to the filing system.112 It should therefore
come as no surprise that there is an extensive number of reported
cases involving this simple sounding requirement under Old Arti-
cle 9."' This litigation typically involved the improper use of the
debtor's trade name or the incorrect reproduction of the debtor's
legal name."4 The secured party would argue that although a
mistake had been made, it fell within the "minor error" exception
found in old Virginia Code section 8.9-402(8)."'
Revised Article 9 introduces a statutory test that is designed to
indicate whether the secured party's mistake is, indeed, minor." 6
If the filing office's standard search logic is able to find the state-
ment when a search is made using the debtor's correct name,
then the debtor's name requirement is satisfied. 7
Electronic commerce is taken into account in a range of Revised
Article 9 sections." 8 One change of obvious importance is that the
debtor is no longer required to sign the financing statement."9
This modification was based on the theory that deletion of the
signature requirement will accommodate electronic filings and
searches.1' However, the financing statement is effective to per-
fect the security interest only if the filing was authorized by the
debtor in an authenticated record. 2' Revised Virginia Code sec-
2000).
112. See id. § 8.9A-519(c)(1), (f)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9-403(4) (Cun. Supp. 2000).
113. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp., 907 F.2d 1430 (4th
Cir. 1990).
114. See id. at 1435. Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-503(c) states in unambiguous
terms that a financing statement is insufficient if the only name it gives is the debtor's
trade name. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-503(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Official comment 2 to this sec-
tion explains that this "reflects the view prevailing under former Article 9 that the actual
individual or organizational name of the debtor on a financing statement is both necessary
and sufficient. .. ."Id. § 8.9A-503 cmt. 2. (Repl. Vol. 2001).
115. See Unsecured Creditors Comm., 907 F.2d at 1435.
116. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-506(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., id. § 8.9A-502(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9A-516(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
119. See id. § 8.9A-502(a) & cmt. 3 (Repl. Vol. 2001). Another change to account for
electronic commerce is the substitution of the word "communication" for the word "presen-
tation" in the section that establishes the rule for what constitutes filing. Compare id. §
8.9A-516(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.9-403(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
120. Id. § 8.9A-502(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
121. See id. 88 8.9A-509(a), -510(a) (RepI. Vol. 2001). Authorization is unnecessary if
the filing is intended to cover an agricultural lien that is in effect at the time of the filing.
See id. § 8.9A-509(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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tion 8.9A-509(b) simplifies matters for the secured party by pro-
viding that the debtor's authentication of the security agreement
automatically authorizes the secured party to proceed with fil-
ing."' Typically, problems will only arise when the secured party
files in advance of the security agreement.123 In such cases, the
debtor must either expressly authorize the filing or ratify it sub-
sequently.124
In addition to stating the debtor's correct name, Revised Article
9, like its predecessor, requires that the financing statement also
provide certain basic information about the underlying collat-
eral.'25 Under Old Article 9, this requirement meant that the fi-
nancing statement had to contain "a statement indicating the
types, or describing the items, of collateral."'26 In the opinion of
most courts, this left out the possibility of a supergeneric descrip-
tion of collateral, such as "all assets."'27 Revised Article 9 rejects
these decisions.128
Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-502(a)(3) provides that a fi-
nancing statement is sufficient if, among other things, it "indi-
cates the collateral covered by the financing statement."'29 With-
out the need to refer to the collateral by item or type, super-
generic descriptions are no longer precluded. 3 ° To eliminate any
lingering or contrived uncertainty on this point, the drafters cre-
ated a new safe harbor, which states that a financing statement
sufficiently indicates the collateral if it provides "an indication
122. See id. § 8.9A-509(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Authentication of the security agreement is
also authorization to file at a later time to cover proceeds, even if the security agreement
says nothing about proceeds. See id. § 8.9A-509(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
123. See id. § 8.9A-509 & cmts. 2-3 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
124. See id. § 8.9A-502(d) & cmts. 2-3 (Repl. Vol. 2001). If the filing is later ratified by
the debtor, is the effective date of the financing statement the date it was filed or the date
of ratification? On this issue, Revised Article 9 is silent. In the event that the secured
party files without the requisite authorization, the debtor is permitted to recover actual
and statutory damages. See id § 8.9A-625(b), (e) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
125. See id § 8.9A-502(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
126. Id. § 8.9-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
127. See, e.g., In re H.L. Bennett Co., 588 F.2d 389, 391-92 (3d Cir. 1978).
128. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-504(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
129. Id. § 8.9A-502(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
130. Compare id. § 8.9A-502(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.9-402(1) (Cum. Supp.
2000).
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that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal
property."
1 1
The third requirement for a sufficient financing statement is
that it must name the secured party or its representative.'32 This
change is a bit obscure, but helpful. In situations where several
secured parties participate in a single loan and security interest,
the parties now have the option, if they wish, to provide the name
of a single representative, whether or not that representative is
actually one of the secured party lenders.'33 Thus, the person
named will be the "secured party of record"13' and will have the
attendant statutory power to amend or terminate the financing
statement.
13 5
V. PRIORITY CONFLICTS
The provisions of Revised Article 9 governing priorities gener-
ally track their analogues in Old Article 9, although there are
several changes worth noting. The following is an overview of
those changes.
A. Secured Party v. Secured Party
The basic priority rule of Revised Article 9 is substantively un-
changed from the old law, although a few alterations were made
necessary by the addition of new forms of collateral and methods
of perfection. Thus, under revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-
322(a), as under old Virginia Code section 8.9-312(5), priority is
awarded to the secured party who is first to either file a financing
statement or to otherwise perfect its security interest.'36 The re-
vised provision does, however, make explicit what was implicit in
131. Id. § 8.9A-504(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
132. Id. § 8.9A-502(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Old Article 9 was silent on whether a financ-
ing statement may provide the name of a "representative" of the secured party. See id. §
8.9-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
133. See id. § 8.9A-502(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
134. Id. § 8.9A-511(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
135. See id. § 8.9A-509(d)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
136. Compare id. § 8.9A-322(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 8.9-312(5) (Cum. Supp.
2000).
2001]
832 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:813
its predecessor: that a perfected security interest has priority
over a competing unperfected security interest.
137
The major changes in the revision's priority rules involve what
is described in the Official Comments as non-filing collateral. 38
This is collateral that the secured party will typically perfect by
either possession or control.' 39 With respect to this type of collat-
eral, the drafters evidently believed that there were priority con-
flicts where exceptions to the general first-to-file-or-perfect rule
were warranted. 14 More fundamentally, Revised Article 9 recog-
nizes a hierarchy of perfection methods in which some methods
are superior to others, resulting in situations where, because of
one party's status, the traditional temporal priority rule of first-
in-time is reversed, even though both secured parties perfected by
the same method.' 4 ' Thus, before we can know which secured
creditor has priority, we must first know the status of each and
how each has perfected its interest. Several examples follow.
1. Deposit Accounts
As discussed above, control is the only method to perfect a se-
curity interest in a commercial deposit account when that account
is the secured party's original collateral. 42 The general priority
rule is that the first secured party to obtain control has prior-
ity. 43 However, this is not the case if one of the secured parties is
the bank with which the account is maintained." In that case,
the bank (even if second-in-time) has priority unless the compet-
ing secured party perfected by becoming the depository bank's
customer with respect to the account.145 Finally, if a secured party
has an automatically perfected interest in the account as proceeds
137. See id. § 8.9A-322(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
138. See id. § 8.9A-322 cmt. 7 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
139. See id. ("More specifically, non-filing collateral is chattel paper, deposit accounts,
negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights.").
140. See id. §§ 8.9A-327 to -330 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
141. A hierarchy of perfection methods is not altogether new. Recall that under Old
Article 9 a later-in-time secured party who took possession of the collateral was sometimes
awarded priority over an earlier-in-time secured party who had not. See, e.g., id. §§ 8.9-
115(5), -309 (Cum. Supp. 2000); id. § 8.9-308 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
142. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
143. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-327(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
144. See id. § 8.9A-327(3)-(4) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
145. Id.
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of some other form of collateral, that interest will be subordinate
to an interest perfected by control regardless of the order in
which the interests were perfected.'46
2. Investment Property
One priority rule for the perfection of a security interest in in-
vestment property is temporal. If both secured parties have per-
fected by control, then they rank according to the time of obtain-
ing control.'47 However, there are two important non-temporal
priority rules. First, if the competing interest is in a security enti-
tlement or a securities account that is maintained by a securities
intermediary who is also a secured party, the intermediary will
have priority. 48 Second, a secured party who perfects by control
will have priority over a secured party who perfects by filing. 4 9
3. Instruments
Now, for the first time, a secured party is permitted by Revised
Article 9 to perfect a security interest in an instrument by fil-
ing."'50 If one secured party perfects by filing and a second secured
party takes possession, the secured party with possession will
have priority if he takes possession in good faith and without
knowledge that his transaction with the debtor violates the rights
of the secured party who perfected by filing.'5' Moreover, Revised
Article 9 continues to provide that a holder in due course of a ne-
gotiable instrument has priority over an earlier secured party to
the extent set forth in Article 3.152
146. See id. § 8.9A-327(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
147. See id. § 8.9A-328(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Under old Virginia Code section 8.9-115,
the interests would rank equally. See id. § 8.9-115(5)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2000). If, under re-
vised Virginia Code section 8.9A-328, both secured parties perfect by filing, perfection will
be governed by the general first-to-file-or-perfect rule. See id. § 8.9A-328(7) (Rep. Vol.
2001).
148. See id. § 8.9A-328(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
149. See id. § 8.9A-328(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
150. See id. § 8.9A-312(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
151. See id. § 8.9A-330(d) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Because this non-temporal rule of priority
is couched in terms of "purchasers," it is not limited to secured parties. See id. § 8.1-
201(33) (Repl. Vol. 2001) (defining "purchaser"). Thus, any consensual transferee who has
also given value for the instrument will be similarly protected. See id.
152. See id. § 8.9A-331(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.3A-309 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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4. Chattel Paper
The priority provisions of Revised Article 9 keep the same
structure and, for the most part, the same substance as the for-
mer statutory provisions concerning competing interests in chat-
tel paper. Under Old Article 9, a special non-temporal priority
rule operated in favor of secured parties and other purchasers
who, without knowledge of the prior security interest, gave new
value and took possession of the chattel paper in the ordinary
course of their business. 53
Among the several changes worth noting in new Article 9 is a
rule that makes the non-temporal rule of priority equally applica-
ble to a later purchaser who takes control of electronic chattel pa-
per.'54 Another noteworthy change is the implementation of a re-
quirement that the purchaser not know that the purchase
violates the secured party's rights, replacing the former require-
ment that the purchaser not know that the chattel paper is sub-
ject to the secured party's security interest. 5 5 If the chattel paper
bears a legend indicating that it has been assigned to an identi-
fied secured party, the purchaser is deemed to have knowledge
that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
56
Revised Article 9 continues to contain a slightly different prior-
ity rule if the earlier secured party claims the chattel paper
"merely as proceeds."'57 Revised Article 9 awards priority to the
ordinary course new value purchaser unless the chattel paper in-
dicates "that it has been assigned to an identified assignee."'
153. See id. § 8.9-308 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
154. See id. § 8.9A-330(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Other changes include an explicit require-
ment that the purchaser act in good faith. See id. § 8.9A-330(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Another
change includes a statutory definition of "new value." See id. §§ 8.9A-102(a)(57), -330(e)
(Repl. Vol. 2001).
155. See id. § 8.9A-330(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
156. See id. § 8.9A-330(f) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
157. See id. § 8.9A-330(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9-308(b) (Repl. Vol. 1991). The mean-
ing of the term "merely proceeds" is explained by the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code in PEB Commentary No. 8: Section 9-308. See id. § 8.9A-330
cmt. 3 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
158. Id. § 8.9A-330(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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B. Secured Party v. Buyer
Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-320(a), like its counterpart
in old Virginia Code section 8.9-307(1), provides that a buyer in
the ordinary course of business (other than one who buys farm
products from a farmer) takes title free of any security interest
created by the seller even if the buyer knows of the security in-
terest.5 9 Revised Virginia Code section 8.1-201(9) deals with a re-
lated question that generated much controversy and litigation
under Old Article 9: When during the life of a sales transaction
will a purchaser qualify as a protected buyer? Possible alterna-
tives include: (1) the date of contract formation; (2) the date the
goods are identified to the contract; (3) the date title to the goods
passes to the buyer; or (4) the date the buyer obtains possession
of the goods. The revised definition of "buyer in ordinary course"
now makes clear that buyer status is achieved the moment the
purchaser obtains possession or the remedial right to obtain pos-
session of the goods vis-a-vis the seller. 6 '
A related, but conceptually distinct, question is whether Article
9 should protect a buyer when the seller's secured party retains
possession. The seminal case, Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc.,'61 held that it did. 6 2 Revised Virginia Code section
8.9A-320(e) reverses the rule of Tanbro, stating that the special
buyer in ordinary course priority does "not affect a security inter-
est in goods in the possession of the secured party."
163
While on the subject of buyers, a related revision to Article 2
should be noted. Under the old statute, where the buyer had pre-
paid in whole or in part for the goods and all that remained was
the seller's performance, it was unlikely that the buyer would be
able to recover the goods from the seller or from the seller's trus-
tee in bankruptcy." However, now that revised Virginia Code
159. Id. § 8.9A-320(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9-307(1) (Repl. Vol. 1991). Unlike Old
Article 9, however, revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-321 explicitly gives priority to a
"lessee in ordinary course of business." Id. § 8.9A-321(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001). The same pro-
tection is also afforded to a nonexclusive licensee of a general intangible in ordinary
course. Id. § 8.9A-321(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
160. See id. § 8.1-201(9) & cmt. 9 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
161. 350 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976).
162. Id. at 592.
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-320(e) & cmt. 8 (Repl. Vol. 2001); see also id. § 8.9A-313(a)
(Repl. Vol. 2001).
164. See id. § 8.2-502 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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section 8.2-502 has taken effect, a pre-paying buyer of consumer
goods need only show that he has a "special property" in the
goods.165 This means that in order to recover those goods from the
seller, the goods must be identified to the contract.
C. Purchase-Money Security Interests
Like its predecessor, revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-103
continues to recognize the super-priority status of purchase-
money security interests. 166 Unlike its predecessor, however, the
revised statutory provision makes it clear that not every type of
collateral can be "purchase-money collateral."1 67 Rather, this
characterization is reserved only for goods and software sold or
licensed with goods, and only if the interest in the goods is pur-
chase-money and the software is acquired to be used with the
goods. 1
68
The drafters of the revised statute had to confront the chal-
lenge of determining what happens to a purchase-money security
interest when the original loan has been refinanced. The related
problem of whether purchase-money status is possible when the
security interest in the goods secures more than their purchase
price also needed to be resolved. There was considerable contro-
versy over these issues under Old Article 9, and as a result, many
courts denied purchase-money status in both situations by declar-
ing that the purchase-money character of the security interest
had been transformed into non-purchase money.'69
165. See id. § 8.2-502(1), (2) (Rep. Vol. 2001); see also id § 8.2-501(1) (defining "identifi-
cation"). The conclusion that the seller's trustee will be under an obligation to deliver the
goods embodies two assumptions: first, if the contract is "rejected" by the trustee, it will
have no effect on the buyer's proprietary power over the goods. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)
(1994). Second, the trustee is not able, by virtue of enjoying the powers of a lien creditor,
to avoid the buyer's property interest. See id. § 544(a)(1).
166. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-324(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9-107 (Repl. Vol. 1991 &
Cum. Supp. 2000); see also id. § 8.9A-103(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001) (defining "purchase-money
security interest"). Revised Article 9 section 9-103 introduces, for the first time, the terms
"purchase money collateral" and "purchase-money obligation." See id. § 8.9A-103(a) (Repl.
Vol. 2001). These twin terms are then used in the remainder of the section to explain the
concept of a purchase-money security interest.
167. See id. § 8.9A-103(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
168. See id. § 8.9A-103(b)-(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
169. See generally Mary Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money
Security Interests in Commercial Lending Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 15, 23-39
(1985).
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Revised Article 9 eschews the "transformation" rule in favor of
a "dual status" rule for non-consumer transactions.7 ° The dual-
status rule preserves purchase-money status to the extent that
the amount of the purchase-money obligation can be deter-
mined.'' When the extent of the obligation depends on the appli-
cation of the debtor's payments to a particular obligation, the se-
cured party would be wise to provide for an appropriate method of
allocation in the security agreement.' 2 In the absence of an
agreement by the parties, the debtor may decide how the pay-
ments should be allocated.' 3
VI. DEFAULT AND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS
The drafters of Revised Article 9 removed many of the uncer-
tainties that plagued the enforcement of security interests under
the old statute. Unfortunately, the drafters accomplished this
worthy goal by adding twenty-one sections to the "default" portion
of Article 9.174 To fully discuss each of the twenty-one sections
would require an article devoted entirely to "default;" instead,
this article will introduce only the changes that are most crucial
to the general practitioner.
As under Old Article 9,175 a secured party that exercises its col-
lection and enforcement rights is required to do so in a commer-
cially reasonable manner.'76 Historically, this requirement posed
problems when the collateral was sold for a price that the debtor
claimed was less than its fair value. 7 In particular, considerable
170. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-103(f) (Repl. Vol. 2001); see also id. § 8.9A-103 cmt. 7a
(Repl. Vol. 2001). The drafters took no position on how these issues should be resolved in
consumer transactions. However, Revised Article 9 the new section 9-103 states that
courts should not infer from the drafters' silence a preference for the adoption of the trans-
formation rule in consumer transactions. Id. § 8.9A-103(h), cmt. 8 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
171. See id. § 8.9A-103(e) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
172. See id. § 8.9A-103(e) & cmt. 7b (Repl. Vol. 2001).
173. See id. § 8.9A-103(e)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001). If there is no agreement by the parties,
and the debtor has not manifested his intention, payments will be allocated to unsecured
obligations first and then to secured obligations in the order in which they were incurred.
See id. § 8.9A-103(e)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
174. In Old Article 9, seven default provisions formed Part 5. Id. §§ 8.9-501 to -507
(Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000). The revised default provisions now form Part 6,
comprised of twenty-eight sections. Id. §§ 8.9A-601 to -628 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
175. See id. §§ 8.9-502(2), -504(3) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
176. See id. §§ 8.9A-607(c), -610(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
177. See id. § 8.9-502 cmts. 1-2 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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uncertainty surrounded the issue of whether the price of the col-
lateral was one of the terms of the disposition that needed to be
commercially reasonable. 7 ' To answer this question directly, the
drafters put the following statement in two Official Comments:
"While not itself sufficient to establish a violation of this Part, a
low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all as-
pects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially
reasonable."'79 But the drafters did not stop there. Because cer-
tain buyers at a foreclosure sale may lack the economic incentive
to pay a fair price, the drafters crafted a special rule for disposi-
tions to an "insider": if a secured party, a person related to a se-
cured party, 8 ° or a secondary obligor 8' buys the collateral at a
foreclosure sale for a price that is significantly below what an in-
dependent third party would have paid at a commercially reason-
able sale, the secured party's deficiency claim is calculated based
on what that unrelated third party would have paid.'82
The Revised Article 9 clarifies and alters a number of aspects
concerning the secured party's obligation to give notice prior to
disposing of the collateral.8 3 One important split resolved by the
revision deals with guarantors. Old Article 9 was vague on
whether a guarantor was a "debtor " "s4 for purposes of the right to
receive pre-disposition notice and the protection of the non-
waivable rules of old Virginia Code section 8.9-501(3)(b). Revised
Article 9 settles the matter by requiring that notification of dispo-
sition be sent to all guarantors and other secondary obligors; it
further provides that the right to receive such notification may
not be waived prior to default.8 5
If the collateral is not consumer goods, then, in addition to
sending notice to the debtor and any secondary obligor, disposi-
178. See id.
179. Id. §§ 8.9A-610 cmt. 10, 8.9A-627 cmt. 2 (Repl. Vol. 2001); see also § 8.9A-627(a)
(Repl. Vol. 2001).
180. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(62)-(63) (Repl. Vol. 2001) (defining "person related to").
181. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(71) (Repl. Vol. 2001) (defining "secondary obligor").
182. See id. § 8.9A-615(f)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2001); see also id. § 8.9A-615 cmt. 6 (Repl. Vol.
2001).
183. See id. § 8.9-504(1), (3) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
184. See id. § 8.9-105(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2000) (defining "debtor"); see also id. § 8.9-105
cmt. 2 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
185. See id. §§ 8.9A-611(c), -624(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001). The notice requirement assumes,
of course, that the secured party knows the identity of the guarantor or other secondary
obligor. See id. § 8.9A-628(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
ARTICLE 9
tion notifications must also be sent to "any other person from
which the secured party has received, before the notification date,
an authenticated notification of a claim of an interest in the col-
lateral."'86 This is not new.' However, the return to the pre-1972
rule that notice also must be given to any secured party who, ten
days before the notification date, has filed a financing statement
or otherwise perfected its interest in the collateral under a federal
statute or regulation, or under a state certificate of title statute,
is new.
88
As to the timing and the contents of the notice, Revised Article
9 contains three safe-harbor provisions that secured parties will
undoubtedly find quite helpful. One safe-harbor provision is for
non-consumer transactions only. It provides that the statute's
"reasonable time" requirement is satisfied if the notification is
sent at least "ten days or more before the earliest time of disposi-
tion" stated in the notice.'8 9 However, when it comes to the con-
tents of the notice, secured parties will benefit from provisions
providing both a safe-harbor form for commercial transactions90
and a more detailed form for consumer goods transactions.' 91
The revised and the former versions of Article 9 both state
that, after default, a secured party may "propose to retain the col-
lateral in satisfaction of the obligation."'9 2 Under the language of
the old statute, however, several questions arose. First, does the
option of "strict foreclosure" depend upon the secured party hav-
ing possession of the collateral?9 3 Second, if the secured party
fails to dispose of the collateral within a reasonable period of
time, is he deemed to have accepted the collateral in full satisfac-
186. Id. § 8.9A-611(c)(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
187. See id. § 8.9-504(3) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
188. See id. § 8.9A-611(c)(3)(B)-(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001); see also id. § 8.9A-611 cmt. 4
(Repl. Vol. 2001).
189. See id. § 8.9A-612 (Repl. Vol. 2001). With respect to consumer transactions, the
courts will have to decide for themselves how much time must elapse between the sending
of the notice and the disposition of the collateral. See id.
190. See id. § 8.9A-613(5) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
191. See id. § 8.9A-614(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Notice that "consumer-goods transaction" is
a new term, meaning a transaction in which consumer goods are used to secure an obliga-
tion incurred for "personal, family, or household purposes." Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(24) (Repl.
Vol. 2001).
192. Id. § 8.9A-620(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001); id. § 8.9-505(2) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
193. See id § 8.9A-620 cmts. 5-7 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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tion of the debt?14 Third, may the secured party accept the collat-
eral in partial satisfaction of the debt?'95 Fortunately, Revised Ar-
ticle 9 provides answers to these questions.
Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-620(a) makes clear that the
secured party's possession of the collateral is not a prerequisite to
strict foreclosure in commercial and consumer transactions.96
Thus, no distinction is drawn between tangible and intangible
collateral. Also, revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-620(b) elimi-
nates the possibility that the secured party's delay in disposing of
the collateral could result in an implied or constructive strict
foreclosure.' 97 Finally, if the transaction is not a consumer trans-
action, Revised Article 9 provides that there can be a retention in
partial satisfaction of the debt if both the debtor and the secured
party agree in an authenticated record.9
8
Revised Virginia Code section 8.9A-625(b) replicates the sub-
stance of old Virginia Code section 8.9-507 by permitting the
debtor to recover for any loss caused by the secured party's failure
to give notice of the intended sale or other disposition of the col-
lateral or to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner.' 99 Un-
der the former statute, that was not necessarily the only remedial
consequence of the secured party's non-compliance with the pro-
visions of Article 9.20 Courts were split three ways as to the effect
a creditor's non-compliance had on its right to recover a deficiency
judgment: either (1) the creditor was permitted to recover the de-
ficiency, but the recovery was subject to a reduction for any dam-
ages provable by the debtor under old Virginia Code section 8.9-
507;201 (2) the creditor was absolutely barred from any recovery; °2
194. See id. § 8.9A-620 cmt. 6 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
195. See id. § 8.9A-620(a), (g), cmt. 12 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
196. Id. § 8.9A-620(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Under the version of revised Article 9 promul-
gated by NCCUSL and the ALI, if the collateral is consumer goods, strict foreclosure does
depend upon the secured party having possession. See U.C.C. § 9-620(a)(3) (1999).
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-620(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001). Because the secured party must
consent to the acceptance in an authenticated record or send a proposal to the debtor, the
debtor would be precluded from proving an oral agreement that the collateral would be
accepted in full satisfaction of the debt. See id. § 8.9A-620(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
198. See id. § 8.9A-620(a), (c) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
199. Id. § 8.9A-625(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
200. See id. § 8.9-507 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
201. See id. § 8.9-507(1) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
202. See, e.g., First Va. Bank Mountain Empire v. Ruff, 27 Va. Cir. 286 (Cir. Ct. 1992)
(Wise County).
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or (3) recovery was permitted to the extent that the creditor was
able to overcome a rebuttable presumption that the collateral's
value equaled the amount of the debt. °3 Revised Virginia Code
section 8.9A-626(a) resolves the controversy by adopting the re-
buttable presumption rule for all transactions, including con-
sumer transactions. 24 However, the version of Revised Article 9
that was submitted to the states by NCCUSL and the ALI is si-
lent on the appropriate rule for consumer transactions, deferring
instead to the court's discretion.0 5
VII. TRANsITION
Part 7 of Revised Article 9 governs the transition from the old
article to the new article. If we assume that the security interest
was perfected under the Old Article 9 (or otherwise) at the time
the revision took effect, the critical question is whether the se-
cured party must take further action after the effective date for
the security interest to maintain its enforceable, perfected
status.0 6 The answer is maybe, but not immediately. Consider
the following hypothetical situations:
1. Assume that the debtor is a Virginia corporation that does
business only in Virginia. On April 5, 2000, the secured party per-
fected a security interest in the debtor's inventory by filing a
proper financing statement in Virginia.2 7 Reperfection is not re-
quired because the steps taken by the secured party under Old
Article 9 would be sufficient to perfect the security interest under
the revision.20 ' Also, if the secured party wished to extend the ef-
fectiveness of the financing statement beyond five years, it would
do so by filing a continuation statement in Virginia.0 9
2. The facts are the same as in the preceding hypothetical ex-
cept that the debtor is a Delaware corporation whose inventory is
203. See, e.g., Smith v. Paige, 19 Va. Cir. 359 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Richmond City).
204. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-626(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
205. See U.C.C. § 9-626(a)-(b) (1999).
206. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.9A-703(a), -705 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
207. See id. §§ 8.9A-310(a), -501(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001). The proper place to file under Old
Article 9 was where the collateral was located (i.e., Virginia), and the proper place to file
under Revised Article 9 is where the debtor is incorporated (i.e., Virginia). See supra notes
100-10 and accompanying text.
208. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-703(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
209. See id. § 8.9A-705(d) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
20011
842 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:813
located in Virginia. The difference between this situation and the
prior is that the pre-transition filing would not be proper as an
initial filing post-transition.21 ° Revised Virginia Code section
8.9A-705(c) provides that the financing statement remains effec-
tive until the earlier of its normal lapse date or June 30, 2006.211
However, if the secured party wishes to extend the effectiveness
of the filing beyond the initial five year period, it cannot do so by
filing a continuation statement in Virginia.212 Instead, it must file
a financing statement in the jurisdiction in which an original fil-
ing would be proper under Revised Article 9 (i.e., Delaware).213
3. Assume that on April 5, 2000, the secured party perfected a
security interest in instruments by notification to a bailee under
the old Virginia Code section 8.9-305.214 In one respect, this hypo-
thetical is similar to the preceding one: in both, the perfection
step taken before the revision's effective date would not satisfy
the requirements for perfection under Revised Article 9.215 Yet,
there is an important difference. Situations where the post-
revision change has nothing to do with the filing of a financing
statement in a new required location are governed by revised
Virginia Code section 8.9A-703(b), which provides that the secu-
rity interest is perfected for one year following Revised Article 9's
effective date.216 If the secured party takes the necessary steps to
satisfy the requirements for perfection within that period, the se-
curity interest remains perfected thereafter.217
210. See id. §§ 8.9A-307(e), 8.9A-703(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
211. Id. § 8.9A-705(c) (Repl. Vol. 2001). One consequence of this rule is that, until June
30, 2006, third parties must search for financing statements both where a filing would
have been proper under Old Article 9 and where a filing is proper under Revised Article 9.
212. See id. § 8.9A-705(d) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
213. See id. § 8.9A-706(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
214. Id. § 8.9-305 (Cum. Supp. 2000); see also id. § 8.9A-313(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
215. See id. § 8.9A-313(a), (c) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
216. Id. § 8.9A-703(b) (Repl. Vol. 2001). The situations governed by revised Virginia
Code section 8.9A-703(b) are not limited to those where there is a post-revision change in
the method of perfecting the security interest. Also covered are situations where the secu-
rity interest would not have attached if the pre-revision attachment steps were taken post-
revision (e.g., the pre-revision security agreement in a consumer transaction describes the
collateral as "all securities accounts") and where the transaction formerly was not gov-
erned by Old Article 9 but now is within the scope of Revised Article 9 (e.g., secured party
had an enforceable pre-revision lien on a deposit account under non-Code law). In all of
these cases, if the creditor does not comply with Revised Article 9 within one year of its
effective date, its interest will become unperfected or, worse, unenforceable. See id. § 8.9A-
703(b) & cmt. 2 (Rep. Vol. 2001).
217. See id. § 8.9A-703(b)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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Finally, a potential pitfall for the secured party lurks in revised
Virginia Code section 8.9A-702. By providing that Revised Article
9 applies to pre-revision transactions, this section subjects the en-
forcement actions of the secured party to scrutiny under the new
rules.2 18 Thus, to the extent that the revision imposes additional
enforcement burdens upon the secured party,219 those new re-
quirements must be met.2
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is good news and bad news about Revised Article 9. The
good news is that by clearing up conflicting interpretations, cur-
ing judicial misconstructions, and incorporating desirable im-
provements that take into account technological developments
and changes in business practices, the drafters of the new statute
have done their best to provide us with a viable product for the
new millennium. The bad news is that Revised Article 9 is far
more complex than the old statute and, consequently, the non-
expert lawyer or judge may find it to be less accessible. Only time
and experience will reveal whether the revision will be as satis-
factory as its promise.
218. See id. § 8.9A-702(a) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
219. See, e.g., id. § 8.9A-614 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
220. See id. § 8.9A-702(a) & cmt. 1 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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